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A lot of dreams have been invested in the Palestinian constitution. Its ambitious
provisions promise a socially progressive, inclusive and tolerant State. Yet,
today, these drafts have lost the semantic ambiguity that typically characterises
constitutions in the making. It is all too easy to decide that those constitutional
words have lost any hint of their politically-induced performative force. It may
be tempting to imagine what things may be like had the Oslo Agreements led
to a successful constitutional draft; or what could have happened had Arafat not
believed that he could somehow artificially turn back the legal clock to a pre-1967
legal patchwork. It is equally tempting to imagine what could – still – happen if,
instead of being merely tolerated, perduring customary laws were encouraged to
lend their full gravity to a burgeoning civic movement. The sovereignty deficit that
plagues the Palestinian constitution-making effort may turn out to be an asset if, by
standing in the way of establishing a constitutional democracy from the top down,
it has allowed customary practices to flourish.
Keywords
Palestinian constitution, self-determination, sovereignty, customary law, urf,
Gandhi, Swaraj, sovereignty, legal pluralism, Oslo Agreements
1 Introduction
Can words – rather than a state (or army) – constitute a country?1 They would be
words that have taken some knocking about. Seasoned through extensive parleys,
stretched by multi-dimensional aspirations, challenged by occupational anger,
the words of the Palestinian Constitution are meant to carry the weight of their
country. Can they (and should they) carry it all the way towards statehood?
*
University College London, Faculty of Laws. This is an updated version of “Drafting a
Constitution for a Country of Words: The Palestinian Case,” which appeared in (2012) 4(2) Mid
East L Gov 72. Many thanks to Koninklijke Brill for permission to reproduce the sections that
overlap here.
1
`We have a country of words. Speak speak so I can put my road on the stone of a stone. We
have a country of words. Speak speak so we may know the end of this travel'. See: M Darwish,
`We Travel Like Other People' in M Darwish, S al-Qasim and Adonis (eds), Victims of a Map: A
Bilingual Translation of Arabic Poetry, (1984: tr. A al-Udhari) 31.
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An increasing number of Palestinian voices stress the fact that statehood
cannot be, and never was, an end in itself. As a means to promote the rights
of all segments of the Palestinian population, statehood is only viable if a
certain number of conditions are met. Prominent among them is the state's
accountability to the whole of the Palestinian population.
In March 2011, the Palestinian Legislative Council's (PLC) constitution-
drafting committee was asked to `finalise' its work `in accordance with the merit
of finalising the independent Palestinian State's establishment'. Yet raising con-
cern about the merit of such `finalising' has not so far dampened the ambition of
this constitutional draft.2 Its endeavour to set the basic legal framework for lim-
iting and organising the powers of the executive, legislature and judiciary (with
significantly greater staunchness than other Arab constitutions)3 is not only an at-
tempt to shape a way of life; its performative language defiantly blazons the very
elements that have until now stood in the way of this aspiration. Constitutions
do not usually define borders or the rights of its `refugees'; nor do they usually
come before statehood.
What can, and what do, constitutions usually constitute? Chalmers suggests
a threefold answer to this question, distinguishing between the `epistemological'
setting out of `the conditions which enable individuals to have a conception of
the political or legal'; the formal identification of the `subjects of the rights and
entitlements bestowed by the Constitution'; and the forging of some kind of
aspirational identity or so-called `politics of the soul.'4 As this framework proves
helpful as a bid to structure my discussion of the Palestinian constitution-making
endeavour, this paper is structured along these three themes, starting with `the
sphere of the legal.'
2
Two main processes of writing constitutional drafts have been conducted in parallel. Under the
auspices of the PLO, drafts have been written since 1988; the latest draft, (`Third Draft') was
written during the build-up towards the establishment of the Palestinian State in Provisional
Borders within the framework of the Second Phase of the Roadmap. Under the auspices of
the Palestinian Authority, the PLC presented the Basic Law in 1997 as an interim constitution.
This document was not approved by Arafat until 2002. See The Palestinian Basic Law, 2003
Permanent Constitution draft (trans. N Brown), <http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/basic-
law/2003-permanent-constitution-draft> [accessed 8 December 2014].
3
As it stands, the current draft may still be deemed one of the most liberal constitutions in Arab
history, not only because of the strength of its rights provisions but also because of the genuine
attempt to close many of the loopholes that exist in other Arab constitutions (especially when it
comes to emergency powers and the independence of the judiciary).
4
See: D Chalmers, `Constituent Power and the Pluralist Ethic', in M Loughlin & N Walker (eds),
The Paradox of Constitutionalism (2007) 291.
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2 The sphere of the legal
Even when considered in a strictly epistemological sense, the claim that constitu-
tions somehow `set out the conditions which enable individuals to have a concep-
tion of the political or legal' is problematic. It suggests a transition from some sort
of pre-legal, hazy merging of the legal and political to a formally constituted legal
sphere that lends itself to a specifically legal framework of analysis (as opposed to
its political counterpart). This claim is remarkably akin to that first formulated by
Jellinek at the turn of the 20th century and lends itself to the same objections: any
attempt to sort the legal away from the political fabric that conditions and enables
it leads to an inability to explain the normative status of law.5 This inability is in
turn paid for by an exposure to either some reductive `legal realism' or convenient
reference to an absolute (whether it be God, natural law or otherwise) to ground
law's normative claim.
As a particularly daring instance of `building the ship at sea', the Palestinian
construction of the legal sphere could hardly be more foreign in its eclectic
pragmatism to the romantic claim that constitutions somehow constitute the
sphere of the legal (even if only epistemologically). When, in September 1993, the
signing of the first of the Oslo Agreements entrusted the Palestinian leadership
with some control over a small territory, the Palestine Liberation Organization's
Legal Committee quickly drafted a provisional constitutional document, which
was fiercely criticised both externally6 and internally.7 As a result, the Palestinian
Authority was established before any basic law was issued, hence prompting an
enduring difficulty, given the Palestinian Authority's limited representativeness
(I develop this issue at length in section 2).8 It also meant, more importantly, that
the emerging Palestinian institutionswere left devoid of any clear `non-Oslo' legal
5
In a bid to free legal science from the `vice of methodological syncretism', Jellinek denounced
as illegitimate any amalgam of different methods of cognition, observing: `[i]f one has compre-
hended the general difference between the jurist's conceptual sphere and the objective sphere of
natural processes and events, one will appreciate the inadmissibility of transferring the cognitive
method of the latter over to the former.' See G Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte
(trans. S Paulson, in S Paulson, B Litschewski Paulson and M Sherberg, Normativity and Norms:
Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (OUP, 1998) 28.
6
The draft proclaimed Jerusalem the capital and clearly aimed at the production of a permanent
constitution for a sovereign state (this is still very much the case in the current 2003 draft).
7
The hasty drafting lacked any publicity and was unlikely to stand in the way of Presidential
authoritarianism.
8
While the PLO purports to represent Palestinians everywhere (this includes 4.7 million United
Nations registered refugees), the Palestinian Authority represents the Palestinian population of
the West Bank and Gaza.
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ground. Arafat's answer to this predicament was bewildering: upon assuming
leadership of the Palestinian Authority, he issued a decree purporting to restore
the legal status that existed prior to the 1967 Israeli occupation.9 This meant the
restoration of an impossibly eclectic patchwork of British, Jordanian, Egyptian
and Israeli pre-1967 laws. It also implied that all post-1967 Israeli orders were
to be deemed no longer valid; a logical conclusion which was not, however,
followed in practice (some post-1967 Israeli military orders are still implemented
by Palestinian courts on the basis that they have not been specifically repealed).
The resulting legal framework has been described as a `salad',10 with layer upon
layer of concomitant legal regimes whose applicability depends –within Palestine
itself – on location, subject matter and nationality.
An individual (let's call her Nuzha)11 standing in a street in Jericho12 may go
to a Palestinian court to solve a civil matter according to Jordanian law; may face
criminal charges on the basis of the Jordanian Penal Code or the revolutionary
Penal Code of the PLO (or tried for `security offences' by either the Israeli
9
For a study of the Palestinian legal system under the BritishMandate, see: N Bentwich, `The legal
system of Palestine under the mandate' (1948) 2Middle East Journal 33.
10
`The Palestinian legal system can be compared to a tossed salad, with layers of different laws and
systems all mixed up into a confused mess. This situation in the Palestinian Territories is per-
haps unprecedented in modern history'. See: WMuhaisen, `The Palestinian Legal System' (essay,
2003), The Palestinian Legal System, <http://www.theyap.org/showcase/politicsandlaw/pales-
tinianlegalsystem.htm> [accessed 17 November 2011].
11
Nuzha may be a national of any country except Israel: as an Israeli citizen `settled' in Jericho,
she would be subjected to Israeli law. Note that even if she were born and lives in Jericho,
Nuzha's ability to participate in Palestinian elections is subject to Israel's control: While the
Interim Agreement was to have given the Palestinian Authority power to keep and adminis-
ter registers and records of the population, power was limited to printing changes in the Pales-
tinian Population Registry, common to theWest Bank and Gaza, provided that Israel had already
approved the changes. See: S Bashi & K Mann (Gisha: Legal Centre for Freedom and Move-
ment),Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza (2007) 50-54, <http://www.gisha.org/User-
Files/File/Report%20for%20the%20website.pdf> [accessed 11 November 2014].
12
As a major population centre within the West Bank, Jericho is part of `Area A', where the
Palestinian Authority in theory exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of life including internal
security (Israel however retains its ability to intervene if it deems it necessary). In `Area B'
(generally the lesser populated towns etc.) Israel has control over security (the Palestinian
Authority cannot operate its own security forces in this area). `Area C' (which consists of major
parts of the West Bank territory), for its part, is still under total Israeli control. The Palestinian
Authority has no jurisdiction over there. Settlers now outnumber Palestinians in Area C by two
to one.
From Constitutional Words to Statehood? 5
military courts13 or the Palestinian Authority's own state security courts);14 would
need to refer to Ottoman law to resolve any land dispute or set up a charitable
organisation15 and may, independently of the above, rely on customary law as a
route towards dispute resolution.16 Nuzha's cousin, standing in an East Jerusalem
street (a mere 30-minute drive from Nuzha), will be subjected to a very different
set of laws. Israel's unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem effectively means that
the 260,000 Palestinians who live there are exclusively subject to Israeli law.
If issued tomorrow, the Palestinian constitutionwould not necessarily change
any of this.17 As a strategic element in the construction of a state-like apparatus,
a Palestinian constitution may have an important role to play in the gradual
transition from a de facto to a de jure state. Yet it is far from clear whether, as
things currently stand,18 the establishment of a Palestinian state is the best way
(or even a way) of achieving equality of rights for all Palestinians.19
13
Security offenses are defined broadly and may include charges as varied as stone-throwing or
membership in outlawed organisations.
14
The Palestinian Authority's state security courts have come to attract attention (public awareness
of these state security courts seems otherwise worryingly low) following the debate triggered
by the Palestinian Authority's recourse to the death penalty: a total of 92 different sentences
of capital punishment have already been delivered since the inception of the Palestinian
Authority, of which 16 have already been executed. In June 2005, the President of the
Palestinian Authority issued an order for a retrial by a civilian court of all those sentenced
to death under the Revolutionary Penal Code in military courts. No new sentences were
delivered in 2006 or 2007, but sentences were again delivered by military courts in 2008
(13), and 2009 (17). See: S. Nusseibeh, Capital Punishment under the Palestinian Authority
(Paper presented at the World Congress Against the Death Penalty, Geneva, 24 February 2010),
<sari.alquds.edu/doc/capital_punishment%2023-2R.doc> [accessed 22 November 2014].
15
Until four years ago, the same Ottoman law governed the setting up of charitable organisations
in Israel.
16
Otherwise known as `Urf', Arabic for `that which is known', this system of customary law extends
to a wide number of Arabic countries. Mainly aimed at preventing further damage within the
communities of either of the individuals involved in a dispute, it consists in a set of conflict
resolution procedures promoting active community involvement.
17
One way of negotiating the various pitfalls of drafting a constitution while under occupation
would be for the Palestinian drafters to envisage a transitional constitution whose sunset clause
would clearly signal its bridging role towards a process that is more comprehensive and hence
does not suffer from the same legitimacy deficit.
18
Geographically, the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements leads some experts (both
Palestinian and Israeli) to deem the establishment of a Palestinian state impossible. Politically, the
moribund state of the Palestinian National Council leads some to highlight the hazards inherent
in the political disenfranchisement of more than half of the Palestinian population.
19
`[A]s the prospect of a genuine – a sovereign and independent – Palestinian state has receded,
another discourse has returned, one with much deeper roots in the Palestinian political
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The current layers of concomitant legal regimes may not sit well with the
positivist idea that all law must originate in a single power source. In fact, it
may be considered a healthy reminder of the possibility of taking a broader (and
less Westphalian) view of law, built around a diffuse network of legal norms.
From this perspective, the Palestinian legal maze could be deemed an incentive
to research ways in which the existing system of customary law may provide for
and support the grass-roots advocacy of Palestinian rights in a way of which a
formal (written) Palestinian constitution may not be capable.
3 Identifying the subjects of Palestinian rights
Article 2 of the current Basic Law states: `[t]he Palestinian people are the source
of all power'. This sounds odd. Are `the people' not, by definition, the source
of all power? Without the political might engendered by a group of individuals
pondering ways of living together, there could not be any constitution, let alone
any law. Political power, understood as the power to (re)shape social interactions
in the light of moral or prudential concerns cannot but emanate from the people.
Article 2 goes on to state that the Palestinian people are the source of all
power `which shall be exercised through the legislative, executive, and judicial
authorities, based on the principle of separation of powers, and in the manner set
forth in this Basic Law.' The distinction between the `power' referred to in the
first part and the `powers' (legislative, executive and judicial) that ought to remain
`separated' contributes to the oddity of this English translation. As it turns out,
an `s' after the initial reference to `power' seems to have been lost in translation,20
which suggests that the drafters probably had in mind something like article 33
of the Belgian Constitution: `[a]ll powers emanate from the Nation'.
The peculiar formulation of article 2 may well find its roots in what it was
trying to avoid saying, for there is one word – `sovereignty' – whose absence is
noteworthy. Most constitutions use the term at one point or another, including
imagination than talk of statehood, andmuch closer to the ideas that inspired the Arab uprisings.
It's often forgotten that until the mid-1970's, Palestinians were looking not to establish a state
but to achieve ``national liberation'', to restore their rights in the land from which they had been
driven – beginning with the right of return. Palestinians rarely talk about statehood, but they
often talk about their rights; statehood is viewed, at best, as a means to achieve them'. See: A
Shatz, `Is Palestine next?' (2011) 33 London Review of Books 9.
20
See: Basic Law 2009 (Palestinian Legislative Council) Article 2.
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the South African,21 Egyptian22 and French constitutions,23 which are all known
to have had some influence on the Palestinian drafting process. The relatively
recent Iraqi and Afghan constitutions give pride of place to the concept: `[t]he
law is sovereign. The people are the source of authority and legitimacy […]'24
and `[n]ational sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the nation that exercises it
directly or through its representatives.'25
Beyond its silent influence on the constitutional draft, the distorting effect of
this `sovereignty issue' can also be seen at work at a more insidious level. When
it comes to defining what and who constitutes the Palestinian people, its struggle
for sovereignty may be seen as a catalyst: religious and cultural differences are
meant to retreat (not necessarily successfully) in front of the national liberation
campaign.
Who decides who belongs to the Palestinian people and what interests are
shared by it?26 An answer formulated predominantly in terms of ending the
occupation is bound to be precarious.27 An optimistic reading of the ongoing
drafting effort would deem the constitution's extensive human rights provisions,
as well as its conspicuous concern for safeguarding the rule of law, to point
to a genuine move towards a positive and idealist construction of Palestinian
21
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (South Africa) Art 1: `[t]he Republic of South
Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values'.
22
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1971 (Egypt) Art 3 as it stood in 2003: `[s]overeignty is
for the people alone who will practise and protect this sovereignty and safeguard national unity
in the manner specified by the Constitution.' This has since been replaced, in the 2011 Interim
Constitution, by `[s][overeignty is for the people alone and they are the source of authority. The
people shall exercise and protect this sovereignty, and safeguard the national unity.'
23
Constitution of France 1958 (France) Art 3: `[l]a souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple qui
l'exerce par ses représentants et par la voie du référendum. Aucune section du peuple ni aucun
individu ne peut s'en attribuer l'exercice.'
24
Iraqi Constitution 2005 (Iraq) Art 5.
25
Constitution of Afghanistan 2003 (Afghanistan) Art 4.
26
When raised in the context of a conference organised by Al-Quds University on the Palestinian
Constitution-making endeavor (this conference, held on 7 and 8 May 2011, was attended by a
mix of academics, diplomats and Palestinian officials), the question of what or who `constitutes'
the Palestinian people was notably met with a slightly impatient: `it's widely agreed that the
Palestinian people includes each and every refugee around the globe.' See: Conference on
Palestinian Constitution: Perspectives and Challenges, Al-Quds University, 7-8 May 2011.
27
An answer à la Schmitt, inviting a substantivisation of politics and citizenship, whichwould hence
be defined by the sharing of certain physical or moral qualities, is even more dangerous: see
generally, for example, C Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty
(MIT Press, 1985). It is of course more than doubtful whether members of a polity can identify
any set of qualities, moral or otherwise, which uncontroversially defines them as a political unity.
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aspirations.28 Far from being settled or reducible to the refugee question, the
ongoing delineating of a Palestinian `social spirit' may be the most important
byproduct of this constitution-making endeavour.
For a newly formed people to understand wise principles of politics
and to follow the basic rules of statecraft the effect would have to
become the cause; the social spirit which must be the product of
social institutions would have to preside over the setting up of those
institutions; men would have to have already become the advent of
law that which they become as a result of law.29
Now itmight seem that acknowledging this circularity – what is presupposed
as coming before (the Palestinian people) invariably comes after (if at all) – `must
be costly to a democracy, or demoralizing: If the [Palestinian] people do not exist
as a prior – or even as a post hoc – unifying force, then what will authorize or
legitimate their exercises of power?'30 But denial of this issue is costly too.
The cost of shrugging off the inevitably circular (and hence open-ended) pro-
cess that underlies the collective self-definition at the heart of any constitutional
practices probably finds its most powerful theoretical illustration in the works of
Carl Schmitt. His endeavour to determine what binds together the members of
a community in substantive terms – as a set of qualities shared by `the people' –
undeniably topples any hint of circularity.31 It also leads to considering any ap-
28
While the Palestinian constitution-making process has already managed to arouse a good deal
of public, `civic' debate, it does remain vulnerable to the charge of elitism (a large proportion
of the constitution-drafting committee was educated abroad etc.). See: N Brown, `Constituting
Palestine: The Effort To Write A Basic Law For The Palestinian Authority' (2000) 54Middle East
Journal 25, 25.
29
Jean Jacques-Rousseau, The Social Contract (Penguin Classics, trans. M Cranston, 1968) Book II,
Ch 7, 86-87.
30
B Honig, Paradox, Law, Democracy: Emergency Politics (2009) 15.
31
`The people' unambiguously precedes and conditions the emergence of any legal order. Referring
to Sieyès' theory of the nation's pouvoir constituant, Schmitt emphasises that the word `nation'
`designates the people as a unity capable of political action, with the consciousness of its political
specificity and the will to exist politically [...] The theory of the people's pouvoir constituant
presupposes the conscious will to exist politically, thus a nation [...] The conscious choice
of a certain type and form of this existence, the act through which ``the people gives itself a
constitution'' thus presupposes the state whose type and form is determined. But for the act
itself, for the exercising of this will, there cannot be any procedural rule, no more than for the
content of a political decision. Nation willing it will suffice'. See: C Schmitt, Verfassungslehre
(1928) Ch 8, 79 (my translation).
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peal to ethics the inevitable and insignificant product of power struggles that are,
as such, reducible to `normative nothingness and concrete disorder.'32
The task of determining what interests and aspirations are shared by, and
constitutive of, a community is always going to be an open-ended endeavour.
In a certain (typically Western) understanding of constitutionalism, it is the job of
the constitution to preserve this open-endedness through the imposition of limits
on divided state powers (these limits are `a way of acknowledging that a people is
never directly present to itself as a unity: whoever claims to speak on its behalf
may only do so if the claim can be questioned by another power').33 Yet in some
contexts, the strategic (and formalist) drafting of a constitution (whether it be for
the purpose of gaining international recognition or otherwise) may well have the
opposite effect, stiffening rather than promoting the articulation of socio-ethical
aspirations.
Many claim to speak on behalf the Palestinian people. Yet in their present
state, Palestinian institutions can hardly be said to foster the connection between
political power and its `source' – the Palestinian people (Article 2). The Palestinian
National Council (PNC) is the one body34 that is supposed to represent all
segments of the Palestinian population (whether in the Occupied Territories or
the diaspora).35 The PLC (which has not been able to convene in recent years), in
contrast, only represents Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories. As the
Palestinian Authority's legislative arm, its authority (and raison d'être) stems from
the Oslo Agreements.
The move to secure recognition of statehood at the United Nations (UN) Se-
curity Council may be seen as the culmination of a process condoning the gradual
transfer of power away from the PNC. Established as a short-term administrative
entity charged with the limited governance of a restricted territory,36 the Pales-
32
`Legally, the sovereign decision is (from a decisionist perspective) neither explained by reference
to a norm or to a concrete order, neither inserted in a concrete order; […] The sovereign decision
is absolute beginning, and the beginning (also in the sense of arche) is nothing other than a
sovereign decision. It springs from a normative nothingness and a concrete disorder'. See: J
Kervégan, Hegel, Carl Schmitt: Le politique entre spéculation et positivité (1992) 44 (my translation).
33
H Lindahl, `Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective
Selfhood,' in M Loughlin & N Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power
and Constitutional Form (2007) 9, 22 (emphasis added).
34
There is no definitive list showing who the current members are. Many have died of old age.
35
Because of the high number of Palestinian refugees who are not as yet registered to vote at
the PNC elections (these elections have also been criticised for their lack of transparency),
representation of those scattered throughout the diaspora is still very patchy.
36
Its five-year mandate was extended in 1998.
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tinian Authority has sought to establish all the infrastructure of statehood while
still under occupation. Its latest bid to replace the PLO and substitute it with the
State of Palestine has been widely criticised as overstepping the mark (aside from
being at odds with resolution 43/177).37 As a `subsidiary body, competent only
to exercise those powers conferred on it by the Palestinian National Council [...]
it does not have the capacity to assume greater powers, to ``dissolve'' its parent
body.'38
The greatest peril of this Palestinian Authority-initiated move (even if it has
the PLO executive committee's approval), however, lies in its implications for
those Palestinians scattered across the globe:
If they are `disenfranchised' and lose their representation in the
UN [as a consequence of the PLO's substitution with that of
Palestine], it will not only prejudice their entitlement to equal
representation, contrary to the will of the General Assembly, but
also their ability to vocalise their views, to participate in matters of
national governance, including the formation and political identity
of the State, and to exercise the right of return.39
Sharing the concern `that any potential move to alter the status of the
PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the UN
may have negative implications on the legal position of the Palestinian people,
in particular on the representation of their indivisible and collective rights,'40
senior Palestinian lawyers and scholars a few years ago signed a joint statement
37
In its Resolution 43/177 the UN General Assembly acknowledged `the proclamation of the
State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988' and it decided that
`effective as of 15 December 1988, the designation should be used in place of the designation
Liberation Organization in the United Nations system, without prejudice to the observer status
and functions of the Palestine Liberation Organization within the United Nations system.' See:
GA Res, `Question of Palestine', 43/177, 15 December 1988.
38
G Goodwin-Gill, `Opinion Re The Palestine Liberation Organization, the Future State of Pales-
tine, and the Question of Popular Representation' (10 August 2011) 2, para 7, <http://www.alza-





A al-Qasem et al, `Palestinian lawyers affirm essential role of PLO at UN', Ma'an News Agency,
1 October 2011, <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=425080> [accessed 17
November 2011]), para 5.
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demanding immediate and direct elections to the PNC.41 Given the huge number
of Palestinian refugees who are not currently registered to vote (or registered tout
court), the amplitude of the challenge underlying such elections prompts some to
highlight that this call for elections cannot be more than a symbolic move aimed
at denouncing the legitimacy of the UN bid.42
One may wish to dispute such skepticism. In her seminal report43 (instigated
by the UN High Commission for Refugees) on refugee participation in `country
of origin's political processes', Katy Long draws on recent instances of `out of
country voting' (OCV), including the 2005 and 2010 Iraqi elections,44 to highlight
both their challenges and potential limitations. From a logistical perspective,
one of the difficulties is to facilitate affordable45 travel to and from polling
stations in relative safety46 (postal/online voting may alleviate that difficulty in
countries with an adequate infrastructure) and to safeguard the privacy of voters'
information.
Aside from these technical hurdles, the most difficult task consists of setting
up the criteria determining one's right to vote. Defining these criteria widely, so
as to include the wider diaspora (whether they are registered as refugees or not,
and encompassing second generation migrants) has clear development benefits
(remittances, skills-transfer etc.) and is likely to lead to a more sustainable47
41
Since 1996, 40% of the PNC (those on the PLC) have been directly elected. According to the
(so far tentative, as it has not been signed) Palestinian National Reconciliation Agreement, `the
Legislative, Presidential, and the Palestinian National Council elections will be conducted at
the same time exactly one year after the signing of the Palestinian National Reconciliation
Agreement.'
42
Less often raised, are the grounds on the basis of which one may argue that the definitive power
to decide upon statehood in any form (and the likely compromises that have to go with it) ought
to belong to those Palestinians suffering the daily consequences of the Israeli occupation in Gaza
and the West Bank.
43
K Long, `Voting with Their Feet – A Review Of Refugee Participation and the Role Of UN-
HCR In Country of Origin Elections and Other Political Processes,'United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Services, September 2010, <http://www.un-
hcr.org/4ca08d249.pdf> [accessed 22 November 2014].
44
For the 2005 Iraqi elections, OCV was (belatedly) provided in 14 different countries.
45
The Danish government was the only one to fund the cost of such traveling. See: Long, above n
43, 32.
46
`In the Iraqi elections held in March 2010, for example, Sunni insurgents killed 39 people in
attacks designed to disrupt polling activities.' See: Long, above n 43, 22.
47
`By facilitating refugee and IDP engagement in political negotiations following conflict, these
groups are more likely to understand themselves as stakeholders in the peacebuilding and
reconstruction processes. This in turn is likely to lead to more sustainable repatriation
and return, as refugees and Internally Displaced Persons are both recognized and recognize
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and secure peace-building and reconstruction process.48 Yet the financial costs
associated with such a wide enfranchisement of the diaspora can be significant,
as illustrated by the Iraqi experience.49 The electoral law which belatedly
enfranchised the Iraqi diaspora in 2005 stipulated eligibility criteria that were
very broad `so that estimates of numbers of eligible expatriates included almost
anyone who had left the country at any time for any reason' (voter registration
totaled only 22 percent of the estimated expatriate population in the 14 countries
offering OCV).50
Even if one were to adopt much more restrictive eligibility criteria, for in-
stance by conditioning eligibility to vote to an `intention to return' (a move
which would be very problematic given the continuing expansion of Israeli settle-
ments),51 the sheer number of Palestinian refugees would create unprecedented
difficulties. While the international community should nevertheless be able to
rise to the challenge, one may ponder the extent to which, in the present circum-
stances, PNC elections would empower Palestinians not only to articulate, but
also to carry through their yearning for equal rights.
The power to bring about those aspirations would require a reversal of the
current dynamic, hence a transfer of power away from the Palestinian Authority
towards the PLO, a move that would go against vested Israeli interests. As
unlikely as itmay be, such an institutional revolution is only conceivable if it stems
from grass-roots activism; that is, from the bottom up, rather than from some
ambitious `constitutionalist politics' driven by calls for democratic legitimation.
The peril of a constitutionalist strategy that is mainly outward-looking
(animated by a desire to build `all the trimmings of a state' in hope of gaining
themselves to be equal citizens in their country of origin.' See: Long, above n 43, 6.
48
Long, above n 43, 6, quoting J Milner, `Refugees and the Regional Dynamics of Peacebuilding'
(2009) 28 Refugee Survey Quarterly 13-30: `The overall security of the peace-building process
is also likely to increase, as ensuring refugee and IDP access to civil political space will help
to prevent the emergence of so-called ``spoiler'' refugee groups whose failure to engage in
reconstruction can undermine a post-conflict settlement.'
49
`[V]oting in the 2005 Iraqi elections cost USD $72 million (with an initial budget of USD$92
million), or USD $270 per external voter, a questionable use of international financial resources.'
See: Long, above n 43, 14.
50
J Thomson, `Iraq: A Large Diaspora and Security Concerns,' in International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance' in A Ellis, C Navaro, I Morales, M Gratschew and N Braun
(eds), Voting from Abroad: The International IDEA Handbook (2007) 168, 169.
51
`Given that the reason for insisting on refugees' right to vote regardless of their non-residency
is the fact of their forced displacement, there would appear to be a connection between
refugees' enfranchisement during a period post-conflict reconstruction and at the very least their
intention to return at a future date.' See: Long, above n 43, 26.
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international recognition) lies in its alienating from the law-making process the
very people it was supposed to empower. If a state is not only triggered by, but
remains primarily an answer to, a liberation campaign (rather than a response
to the necessity to articulate and coordinate common goals) it is in danger of
being reduced to an economic and/or administrative state; a state where the
political has been neutralised by legal norms combined with economic welfare
and reduced to the mere `technology of administration.'52
4 Aspirational identities: building `true home
rule' (or `Swaraj')
[The end of the Raj] may bring mere home rule (the rule of the
modern coercive state) but not true home rule (the rule of the just,
limited state); in any case it will not bring about self-rule.53
Gandhi's words are increasingly frequently quoted by Palestinian intellectu-
als54 and activists,55 and not only because of the:
52
C Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy (1932: tr. Jeffrey Seitzer, 2004) 5.
53
A Parel, `Editor's Introduction' in A Parel (ed), Gandhi: `Hind Swaraj' and Other Writings (2009)
lxvi.
54
`CI: People call you the ``Gandhi of Palestine''. What has it meant for you to be held in such high
esteem? MA: I have very much difficulty with that, I am not Gandhi. He is in a class by himself.
My idea was to promote non-violence and Gandhi's teachings with the hope that someone else
would come and pick it up, because I think this is going to take ten to fifteen years before the
Palestinians will be able to accept the struggle in a non-violent way'. See: C Ingram, `Interview
with Mubarak Awad', in C Ingram (ed), In the Footsteps of Gandhi: Conversations with Spiritual
Social Activists (1991) 37.
55
`When we joined UNESCO we were practically creating the power of culture against the cul-
ture of power. That's how countries in the world liberated themselves. That's how a person
like Gandhi who had no military power managed to unify India and get independence. […]
It's the power of the idea, the power of culture, and the power of dignity.' See: M Bargh-
outi, `The UN should accept Palestine as a full member state', The Palestine Monitor, 5 Jan-
uary 2012, <http://www.palestinemonitor.org/details.php?id=26z1esa527yj3cx58fmg> [accessed
19 November 14]; `a principled Palestinian leadership would follow the example of Mandela and
Gandhi, leading the masses in popular resistance and inspiring effective and sustained inter-
national solidarity in order to tip the balance of powers – a necessary condition for exercising
our UN-sanctioned rights'. See: O Barghouti, `Virtual Statehood or the Right of Return,' Occu-
pied Palestine, 14 September 2011, <http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com/2011/09/14/virtual-
statehood-or-the-right-of-return-by-omar-bagrhouti/> [accessed 22 November 2014].
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striking resemblance between the two cases [the creation of Israel
and Pakistan] in establishing political boundaries on ethnic or
religious grounds in regions with mixed populations. Both Pakistan
and Israel, as products of partition, are self-conscious political
models based on such grounds, with Pakistan having sought to
become an Islamic state and Israel a Jewish State.56
Gandhi's words are increasingly quoted primarily because they denounce
any attempt to establish `home rule' from the top-down as delusive: if liberation
is assimilated to the mere toppling of external rule and hasty building of a
Western-style nation state, then it may not be worth it. `Independence must
begin at the bottom. Thus, every village will be a republic or panchayat having
full powers.'57
If there ever was something approaching this ideal of bottom-up, locally
grown independence in post-World War I `Palestine', it was during the early
stages of the first intifada. While it may never have managed to be completely
non-violent (it took a definite, violent turn during the Kuwait Crisis),58 the seeds
of what may properly be termed `embryonic self-rule' were there nevertheless. In
a detailed survey of the legal decision-making structures during the first intifada,
Adrien K. Wing outlines the importance of local popular committees:
In the beginning of the intifada, each locality formed various popu-
lar committees (lijan sha'biya) which became involved in day-to-day
underground governance. By May 1988, there were 45,000 func-
tioning local committees of various types. The local popular com-
mittees elected representatives to larger coordinating committees,
which in turn established regional ties, and then linked up with the
UNLU [Unified National Leadership of the Uprising].59
As the primary legal institution of the intifada, the UNLU sought to control
the use of force and coordinated civil society activities: withholding of taxes,
boycott of Israeli products, work stoppages and mass resignations of the police
56
S Nusseibeh,What Is a Palestinian State Worth? (2011) 32.
57
MGandhi, `Gandhi's Political Vision: The Pyramid vs The Oceanic Circle (1946)' in A Parel (ed),
Gandhi: `Hind Swaraj' and Other Writings (2007) 181, 181.
58
Growing dissatisfaction with the earlier intifada power structure enabled the rise of Hamas and
increasingly bloody internal clashes.
59
AWing, `Legal Decision-Making During the Palestinian Intifada: Embryonic Self-Rule' (1993) 18
YJIL 95, 119 (citations omitted).
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force and tax collectors.60 Consisting of a highly decentralised network of
committees,61 it issued leaflets (bayanat) containing policies and laws. These
laws drew from a variety of legal traditions. Ottoman law (to some extent),62
mandate law, and Israeli military and civil law were largely rejected,63 `either as a
symbolic estrangement from the Israeli administered legal order, or because the
laws promulgated under those systems have been used to compromise Palestinian
rights.'64 Along with parts of Egyptian and Jordanian civil law (and some Islamic
religious law), customary law (urf ) had a large influence on the UNLU.
Known as the ancient legal tradition `urf' (`that which is known'), customary
law is still used to resolve conflicts outside the official civil and religious
courts (which remain to this day considered by many Palestinians as not only
unsympathetic, but illegitimate). Cases that may be handled under urf `include
contract disputes, land matters, interfamilial feuds and personal injuries'.65
`Judges in the civil court generally appear to tolerate the competing system,
sometimes even consciously accommodating it [customary law] by delaying
actions in a case while awaiting a sulh [binding settlement].'66
While respected elders (always men) have traditionally adjudicated and
60
Referring to the above-mentioned `civil society activities,' Salim Tamari writes: `are all essential
features of the process of the withdrawal of Palestinian society from two decades of dependence
on the Israeli colonial state apparatus. The UNLU has exhibited great skill and flexibility in
coordinating these acts of civil disobedience among the rural, urban, and refugee segments
of the population, and in translating them into a collective national act of rebellion. But
they all remain acts of disengagement. To transform them from a process of disobedience to a
process of affirmation necessitates the forging of alternative economic, social, and administrative
structures.' See: S Tamari, `The PalestinianMovement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the
Uprising' (1991) 20 Journal of Palestinian Studies 57, 68.
61
`[L]ocal committees decide when people in their district can sustain demonstrations and/or
strikes, raise money and material aid for the neighboring villages and refugee camps which
may be under curfew, and pay attention to their constituency's morale'. See: G Pressberg, `The
Uprising: Causes and Consequences' (1988) 17 Journal of Palestinian Studies 38, 45.
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`Although Palestinians relied on the Ottoman land code long after the Ottomans left the region,
the Israelis' use ofOttoman land law in amanner that disadvantaged Palestinian property holders
has delegitimized Ottoman law in the eyes of Palestinians'. See: Wing, above n 59, 106-7.
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administered urf, public figures came to the fore during the first intifada.67 Today,
customary law continues to play a major role in Palestinian legal culture, even
if it has come under pressure to reform. Women's groups denounce how it
perpetuates women's social and legal subordination.68 It has been further alleged
that `some customary law judges are illiterate; there are different local versions
of customary law and no unified one, and some arbitrators demand emoluments
verging on bribery.'69 Given the strengthening of Islamic movements since the
1970's, it has become overlaid `by a facade of Islamic symbols.'70
Yet having sustained its authority through four occupations, customary law is
still hailed as an example of Palestinian control over Palestinian affairs according
to Palestinian custom. Unlike the current Basic Law (and the whole legislative
infrastructure that accompanies it), customary law can truly be said to `reign over
the hearts of [Palestinian] citizens':
[t]here will never be a good and solid constitution unless the law
reigns over the hearts of the citizens; […] How then is it possible to
move the hearts ofmen, and tomake them love the fatherland and its
laws? Dare I say it? Through children's games; through institutions
which seem idle and frivolous to superficial men, but which form
cherished habits and invincible attachments.71
The current constitution-drafting effort is anything but frivolous. Some of
its more formal dimension may be captured by Nathan Brown when he writes
(without irony): `[t]hroughout the world, constitutions have become one of the
most important attributes of sovereignty: new states are almost as likely to
issue constitutions as they are to print postage stamps and adopt flags.'72 Now
if the goal is to seek `a past from which we may spring rather than that from
which we seem to have derived',73 it may be worth delaying the issuance of
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I Zilberman, `Palestinian Customary Law in the Jerusalem Area' (1996) 45 Catholic University Law
Review 795, 804.
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stamps (and a constitution) and ponder the extent to which the burgeoning
civic movements74 on both sides of the security fence are truly best served by a
two-state solution. Some form of federalism,75 enabling different communities to
live alongside each other and sharing at least one geographical region ( Jerusalem
– not unlike Brussels today) would arguably have more in common with the
regional structure76 that existed prior to the dismantlement of the Ottoman
Empire (and enabled the peaceful coexistence of various religious denominations)
than a two-state solution.77
5 Conclusion
Sumud means steadfastness, and it has turned into a strategy: when
the imbalance of power is so pronounced, the most important thing
to do is to stay put.78
Years ago, while visiting Jerusalem East, I was invited to a Palestinian house
that had been `occupied' a few days before: a group of young Israeli settlers
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secular, democratic state ``for all its citizens'', where Jew, Christian and Muslim are equal.'
See: D Hearst, `Could Arab staying power ultimately defeat Zionism?', The Guardian, 5
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stormed the house at night, a fight ensued, the (Israeli) police were called. As
the settlers had managed to occupy roughly half of the house, it was decided that
the house should be split in two. I was shown the dividing line separating the part
of the house in which its Palestinian owners could still live, while the other part
was vigilantly guarded by the Israeli settlers. The Palestinian family could not at
any time leave their part of the house empty for fear of losing it altogether. The
settlers, I was told, were invoking ownership rights according to Ottoman law. I
did not get the chance to talk to the settlers or to check any of those underlying
legal claims. I was so struck by the folly of the Israeli police's `solution' and the
extent to which it resembled, in its absurdity, Solomon's compromise, for surely
splitting the house according to the assault's random result (forcing its inhabitants
to live in perpetual fear) undermined the very meaning of a property right?
Yet what surprised me most was the relative impassivity with which the
matter was presented (among Palestinians). The dispassionate tone that ruled
over the discussions that I witnessed left me with the sense that an inconspicuous
peril may well be lurking behind the all too visible, quotidian injustices and
humiliation. What if they (Palestinians and Israelis alike) get used to it? Is it the
case that events that would otherwise arouse powerful emotions can be sunk into
the humdrum by the combined weight of decades of occupation?
A lot of dreams have been invested in the Palestinian constitution. Its
ambitious provisions promise a socially progressive, inclusive and tolerant state.
Yet today these drafts have lost the semantic ambiguity that typically characterises
constitutions in the making. It may be tempting to imagine what things may be
like had the Oslo Agreements led to a successful constitutional draft (established
prior to the Palestinian Authority's coming into existence); or what could have
happened had Arafat not believed that he could somehow artificially turn back the
legal clock to a pre-1967 legal patchwork. It is equally tempting to imagine what
could – still – happen if, instead of being merely tolerated, perduring customary
laws were encouraged to lend their full gravity to the moral sentiments that,
against the odds, manage to sustain a burgeoning civic movement; one that is
capable of establishing `true home rule' or `Swaraj.'
